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Abstract 
 
 
Our article attempts to be yet another empirical contribution to the evolving 
international debate about global Islamist terrorism. We rely on the analysis of 
PEW and World Values Survey data from Muslim publics in different countries 
around the globe to analyze by multivariate promax factor analysis and standard 
OLS multiple regression which factors contributed to the approval or the 
rejection of terrorist acts, measured by such variables as the opinion on suicide 
bombing, Shari’a law and the favorability of terrorist organizations such as 
Hamas and Hezbollah. We also analyze the drivers of general opinions on 
Islamic extremist groups and reactions to the ambitions of Iran and its nuclear 
program.  
 
We arrive at the conclusion that it would be wrong to define radical Islamism 
only in terms of the identification with outright support for the immediate 
“bomb-throwing terror”, while neglecting the underlying ideological and 
dangerous radicalism and also ongoing radicalization of such organizations as 
the Muslim Brotherhood or the Turkish Milli Görüs, which both start, like the 
most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred of “Jews 
and Free Masons” and Western civilization as such, and which for many on 
both sides of the Atlantic appear as “moderate Islamists” and worthy partners 
of dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which the 
armed terrorist groups only can develop. We highlight the role of the 
omnipresent hatred of America and the West which we term “Occidentalism”, 
but also the intense competition between Islamist and secular, Marxist terror 
groups which still exist in the Middle East and the entire Muslim world, and the 
Sunni/Shia competition as well as regional quests for hegemony. With Bassam 
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Tibi we also analyze the close connection between the Islamist sharia ideology 
and the overall aspects of Islamism. Based on PEW data, we show that the two 
main drivers of Muslim opposition against suicide bombing are the rejection of 
honor killing and the death penalty against Muslims who chose to leave the 
Muslim community altogether. Our promax factor analyses confirm the 
relevance of this approach. 
 
Keywords: Relation of Economics to Social Values; Index Numbers and 
Aggregation; Labor; Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and 
Immigrants • Non-labor Discrimination; Economics of Gender • Non-labor 
Discrimination; Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, 
Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - General, International, 
or Comparative; Religion 
 
JEL Classification Codes: A13; C43; F66; J15; J16; N30; Z12 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
There is increasing solid evidence about the devastating nature of global 
Islamist terrorism and its thousands of victims each month, from Nigeria to 
South-East Asia and also, increasingly, in Europe (Institute for Economics and 
Peace, 2014; Neumann, 2014). Robust empirical studies, like the one prepared 
by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political 
Violence and BBC World Service, document that now there are at least 5.042 
monthly deaths from Islamist political violence on a global level (Institute for 
Economics and Peace, 2014; Neumann, 2014). 
 
 
2. Earlier empirical studies on the subject 
 
 
In the vast international literature on the subject, especially two approaches 
seem to offer promising directions of research for the future. One would be 
characterized by cross-national data analysis on which sets of characteristics of 
national states are especially associated with the terror phenomenon and its 
growth. That is to say, to study the phenomenon by the econometrics and 
politometrics of terrorism based on national aggregate data. The other approach 
would be rely on standardized opinion surveys in different countries around the 
globe and to elicit responses from the publics in the countries affected by 
terrorism themselves which factors contribute to the approval or the rejection of 
terrorist acts, so as to be able to project what makes populations resilient or 
susceptible to terrorism. 
 
While we are well aware with Enders, Hoover, and Sandler, 2014; Sandler 
2013, 2014; and Younas and Sandler, 2015 about the relevance of the first 
mentioned approach, we also should underline that in the economics profession 
it has become fashionable to analyze the opportunity costs of terrorism (Freytag 
et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2015). Supreme values (i.e., preferences shaped by 
ideology) also play a role in this approach. When conditions are poor, the 
rewards from terrorism (e.g., solidarity, status) become particularly attractive, 
while the opportunity costs of terrorism are low (e.g., because economic, non-
violent alternatives are scarce). Terrorism, for this school of thought may not 
only be political and demographic, but also socio-economic in character. The 
central proposition of this type of analysis is also that poor socio-economic 
conditions (as indicated by, e.g., low levels of investment, consumption and 
economic openness) make terrorism more attractive. Freytag et al., 2011; and 
Schneider et al., 2015 also argue that these opportunity costs (which are also 
4 
 
reflected in country-specific socio-economic conditions) may influence the 
calculus of terrorists and their supporters. Governments ought to counter 
terrorism not exclusively by relying on the ‘stick’. Better economic 
performance will increase the opportunity cost of terrorism and thus make 
terrorism less likely. Policies that foster growth, investment and economic 
participation may also yield a dividend in terms of a reduction in terrorism. 
World economic openness and overcoming bad institutions will also help in the 
fight against terror.  
 
To analyze the terror problem, also many other scientific approaches were and 
are being applied. The discipline of comparative research on religions 
(Ghobadzadeh, 2014; Küng, 2002; Sacks, 2014; Troll, 2005) certainly is an 
important source of additional information for such endeavors. Also, social 
scientists themselves increasingly lay the groundwork for comparative analyses 
of global religions and their doctrines on peace and war (Juergensmeyer et al. 
2013; Röhrich 2004, 2010).  
 
Among the published literature on the subject, we should highlight the fact that 
hard core analyses on the relationship between religious values and terrorism, 
based on comparative international opinion surveys, are still rather scarce 
(Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004; Blaydes and Linzer, 2010; Cifti, 2010; 
Kostenko et al., 2014; Spierings, 2014; Tessler, 2002, 2004; Tessler and Gao, 
2005; Tessler and Robins, 2007; Yeşilada and Noordijk, 2010; and Zussman, 
2014). The present essay, without underestimating the benefits of the cross-
national data analysis approach, is well within the global comparative opinion 
research tradition. 
 
Given the sheer magnitude of the Islamist terrorist challenge in the context of 
overall global terrorism, we share with Heller (2015) the idea that it is time to 
seriously analyze what sectors of Muslim society who do support extremism 
think and do, and why they think in such a way, while important other segments 
of Muslim society oppose radicalism and terrorism and even combat it. Given 
the still existing real dearth of the debate making use of existing and freely 
available opinion survey research instruments from many countries around the 
world like the “World Values Survey (WVS)”, the “PEW data” or the “Arab 
Barometer” Project, we should conclude that future debates about “Islamist 
terrorism” should above all be survey-data-driven (Tessler, 2002). 
 
Without hesitation, one can say that Mark Tessler’s research on the drivers of 
terrorism as reflected in the Arab Barometer and World Values Survey data 
today is the leading approach in the expanding sub-field of empirical, 
individual-level based survey research on terrorism (Tessler, 2002, 2004; 
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Tessler and Gao, 2005; Tessler and Robins, 2007). Tessler’s main variables, 
measuring Islamism are  
 
 Attitudes Toward Democracy 
 Attitudes Toward Western Culture and Society 
 Support for Terrorism (9/11 attacks et cetera) 
 
Tessler’s widely received empirical analysis, based on Egypt, Morocco, 
Algeria, and Jordan, came to the conclusion that Islamic orientations and 
attachments have at most a very limited impact on views about democracy. 
Strong Islamic attachments do not discourage support for democracy. Tessler 
and Robbins (2007) also underline that there is no support for the hypothesis 
that personal religious involvement, support for the platform of political Islam, 
or opposition to Western values have an important effect on terror support (see 
also: Kurzman and Naqvi, 2010). The real drivers of terror support in the 
MENA region, Tessler believes, are the low levels of confidence in domestic 
political institutions and the negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy held by 
Arab publics. Tessler also, at times, seems to blame the State of Israel and its 
policies for the rise of global Islamism (Tessler, 2004). More recent research, 
however, has begun to question this consensus. 
 
We mention here first of all Blades and Linzer (2010) with their empirical 
research on Muslim anti-Americanism as a domestic, elite-led phenomenon that 
intensifies when there is greater competition between Islamist and secular-
nationalist political factions within a Muslim country.  
 
Spierings (2014) with his World Values Survey based study on Arab countries 
linked denominational belonging (affiliation), commitment (religiosity), 
orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism to 
the support for democracy and politico-religious tolerance. In Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, tolerance levels are remarkably lower than 
“democratic support”; and political Islamist views strongly affect tolerance 
negatively.  
 
A major recent Turkish study also highlights such aspects. Cifti (2010) 
underlines that in ten majority Muslim countries perceptions of gender equality 
are strongly associated with democratic orientations. Political Islamism, 
measured by the World Values Survey item: “Politicians who do not believe in 
God are unfit for public office”, negatively affects the democracy indicators 
(diffuse and specific support for democracy).  
 
A team of Russian authors, Veronica Kostenko, Pavel Kuzmichev and Eduard 
Ponarin, also should be briefly mentioned here (Kostenko et al., 2014). Their 
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paper analyses the relationship between the support of democracy and attitudes 
to human rights: in particular, support for gender equality in the countries 
covered by the first wave of the Arab Barometer project. 80% of democracy 
supporters in the Middle East equal only 17% of those who understand, value, 
and support democracy as they do in the Western world. 
 
In another very influential analysis, based on a rigorous study of openly 
available data from the Washington-based global public opinion research center 
PEW, Shafiq and Sinno, 2010 analyzed the effect of educational attainment and 
income on support for suicide bombing among Muslim publics in six 
predominantly Muslim countries that have experienced suicide bombings: 
Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey. In their study, 
Shafiq and Sinno, 2010 find that the effect of educational attainment and 
income on support for suicide bombings varies across countries and civilian 
“soft” and military targets. Their multiple regression analysis works with the 
following PEW survey predictors to explain suicide bombing support rates: 
 
 Age 
 Below primary education 
 Civil status: married 
 Civilians targets 
 Gender: Male 
 Higher education 
 Income quartile (dummy variable, four quartiles used) 
 Iraq country dummy 
 Number of children 
 Political dissatisfaction 
 Primary education 
 Secondary education 
 
The model starts from the assumption that educational attainment and higher 
income increase political dissatisfaction, which in turn leads to higher rates of 
suicide bombing support, while educational attainment and higher incomes 
themselves decrease support for suicide bombing. Political dissatisfaction has a 
mediating effect which reduces the extent to which education and income 
discourage support for suicide bombing. The authors distinguish various 
country specific effects and note that the effect of education and income on 
attitudes depends on the country and the target of suicide bombings (civilian or 
military). The authors voice two important policy recommendations for global 
decision makers to halt the terrorist tide: one is the continued expansion of 
education with the adoption of peace education in school curricula that 
discourages the use of suicide bombing as a tactic. The second policy 
recommendation is based on the finding that political dissatisfaction reduces the 
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effectiveness of educational attainment and income. Supporting trade, economic 
integration and cooperative international security would improve Muslim 
opinion about Western governments and reduce the widespread feeling in the 
Muslim world that Islam as such is under threat from the West.  
 
In their multivariate study on PEW Research data on terror support, Victoroff, 
Adelman, and Matthews, 2012 test the effect of the perception of being the 
victim of anti-Muslim discrimination on anti-Western political violence. This 
multivariate analysis of the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys 2006 data set 
surveying 1,627 adult Muslim residents of Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
Spain and the 2007 data surveying 1,050 adult Muslim residents of the United 
States support the conclusions that younger age and perceived discrimination 
are both associated with support for suicide bombing in these Muslim diaspora 
populations. Reducing discrimination would reduce the risk of terrorism.  
 
Berger (2014) attempted to distinguish support for violence against civilians 
from support for violence against military targets and features independent 
variables that clearly separate views on US foreign policies from views on US 
culture. His regression model shows that among Egyptian, Pakistani and 
Indonesian Muslims, perceptions of US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern 
oil, or the perceived attempt to weaken and divide the Muslim world are not 
related to support for attacks on civilians in the United States, but “only” to 
support for attacks against US military targets. Approval of attacks on US 
civilians is shaped, instead, by negative views of American freedom of 
expression, culture, and people, and the disapproval of the domestic Arab 
political status quo and the notion of a general US hostility toward democracy 
in the Middle East.  
 
Zhirkov et al., 2014, focusing on Muslim populations in five Muslim-majority 
countries and four Western European countries, examines the correlates of 
popular support for terrorist violence. In both samples, support for terrorism is 
stronger among those who see democracy as a Western political system which 
is not suitable for Muslim societies. Perceived Western economic dominance is 
related to more support for terrorism among Muslims in Western Europe. In the 
Muslim countries, blaming the West for negative international relations is 
associated with greater support for terrorism. The authors say that the 
associations found are remarkably similar across the Western European 
countries but vary considerably across the Muslim countries, preventing 
generalized interpretations. Nevertheless, the findings would indicate that 
perceptions about world politics represent an important factor of pro-terrorist 
views among Muslims. Therefore, the authors suggest that the improvement of 
the relationships between the West and the Muslim world could reduce support 
for terrorism. 
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The following other recent World Values Survey and/or PEW data analyses 
were also well received in the economic literature on terrorism (Schneider et al., 
2015):  
 
 Fair and Shepherd (2006): 14 Muslim countries, 2002: Unclear influence 
of economic conditions on terror support. Support increases with some religious 
factors (e.g., perceived threat to Islam). Results vary across countries. 
 
 Bueno de Mesquita (2007): 13 Muslim countries, 2002: Support for 
terrorism not correlated with education, economic situation and attitudes toward 
the U.S. and democracy. Ambiguous effect of religion on terror support. 
 
 Tessler and Robbins (2007): Algeria and Jordan, 2002: Support for 
terrorism not dependent upon religion and economic situation. Support 
increases with negative assessment of U.S. foreign policy and domestic political 
institutions and leaders. 
 Fair et al. (2010): Pakistan, 2009: Support for terrorism depends on the 
terrorist group and the desire for non-corrupt governments (which in turn is 
related to support for Sharia law). Results vary across regions. 
 
 Shafiq and Sinno (2010): 6 Muslim countries, 2005: Support for suicide 
terrorism depends on its target (attacks against Western military targets are seen 
more favorable than attacks against civilians). Effects of income and education 
vary across countries and interact with political dissatisfaction. 
 
 Mousseau (2011): 14 Muslim countries, 2002: Approval of Islamist 
terrorism is linked to urban poverty but not to poor education and religiosity. 
 
Bueno de Mesquita’s analysis (2007) is especially noteworthy in this context 
because of its very broad and encompassing design. The strongest correlates of 
support for terrorism were the respondents’ attitudes toward the United States as 
a threat to Islam and the respondents’ views of the role of Islam in politics—
though even these correlations, Bueno de Mesquita notes, were fairly weak. For 
Bueno de Mesquita terrorism is, among other things, a tool of propaganda. One 
message of some Islamic terrorist organizations is anti-Americanism. Thus, if 
terrorism is an effective tool of propaganda, it may be that people who support 
terrorism (for whatever reason) end up having strongly anti-American 
sentiments because they are persuaded by the terrorists’ message. Another, 
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related, explanation argues that people who support terrorism have a 
psychological need to justify this support. As a result, they adopt views that 
“rationalize” their support for terrorism. Thus, while they may perceive their 
support for terrorism to be caused by their anti-American views, the opposite 
might be the case—they may have adopted anti-Americanism to justify support 
for terror. Willingness to support terrorism, and willingness to become a 
terrorist, is for Bueno de Mesquita quite a different phenomenon.  
 
 
3. New perspectives on the drivers of terrorism: Occidentalism, Hating the 
West, Hating Jews, Hating Israel 
 
 
For us, it is wrong to define radical Islamism only in terms of the identification 
with outright support for the immediate “bomb-throwing terror”, while 
neglecting the underlying ideological and dangerous radicalism and also 
ongoing radicalization of such organizations as the Muslim Brotherhood (Lebl, 
2014a, 2014b) or the Turkish Milli Görüs (Vielhaber, 2012), which both start, 
like the most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred 
of “Jews and Free Masons” and Western civilization as such, and which for 
many on both sides of the Atlantic appear as “moderate Islamists” and worthy 
partners of dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which 
the armed terrorist groups only can develop (Lebl, 2013; Tibi 2013a, 2013b). 
The United Arab Emirates paper “Gulf News” revealed on June 18, 2014 the 
close ties between two successive US administrations and the Muslim 
Brotherhood: 
 
For the past decade, two successive US administrations have maintained close 
ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, to name just 
the most prominent cases. The Obama administration conducted an assessment 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2010 and 2011, beginning even before the events 
known as the “Arab Spring” erupted in Tunisia and in Egypt. The President 
personally issued Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010, ordering 
an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and other “political Islamist” 
movements, including the ruling AKP in Turkey, ultimately concluding that the 
United States should shift from its longstanding policy of supporting “stability” 
in the Middle East and North Africa (that is, support for “stable regimes” even 
if they were authoritarian), to a policy of backing “moderate” Islamic political 
movements. To this day, PSD-11 remains classified, in part because it reveals 
an embarrassingly naïve and uninformed view of trends in the Middle East and 
North Africa (Mena) region. The revelations were made by Al Hewar centre in 
Washington, DC, which obtained the documents in question. Through an 
ongoing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit, thousands of pages of 
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documentation of the US State Department’s dealings with the Muslim 
Brotherhood are in the process of being declassified and released to the 
public.“ 1 
 
 
So, in disagreement with Tessler we understand Islamism in a much wider 
sense. With Tibi (Tibi, 2007, 2012, 2013a, 2013b) one can even say that 
Islamism is religionised politics, based on the Arabic term din-wa-dawla (unity 
of state and religion) under a system of mandated shari’a law. Tibi also argues 
that the Antisemitism of Islamism is a vital component of the Islamist ideology 
and very different from both the old Islamic Judeophobia and modern pan-Arab 
nationalist Antisemitism. Islamist contemporary Antisemitism now assumes the 
so-called “Jewish conspiracy against Islam since 622”. Thus our new research 
strategy, focusing on a much wider understanding of Islamism, attempts to 
capture the totality of anti-Westernism. 
 
Under the influence of Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) 
(Bergesen, 2008; Qutb, 1990, 2000; Qutb and David, 2006; Qutb, Salahi and 
Shamis, 1979), the idea was proposed in the Muslim world at the beginning of 
the 1960s that Jews are the enemies of Islam from its inception; and that an 
independent Jewish political existence would relinquish territory within the 
“house of Islam” (Dār al-Islam). Both the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood as well as 
the Iranian Khomeinite Shiʿa movement took up the virulent Antisemitism, so 
characteristic of the works of Sayyid Qutb (Ganji, 2013). 
 
In this context, the next question arising in this context is what is so specific in 
Islamist Antisemitism compared to that in the West and the former Communist 
countries and what leads to such differences in its forms and outcomes. With 
Heinemann et al. 2007; Kaplan and Small, 2006; Lebl, 2013; Mansur, 2015; 
Paz, 2015; Tibi, 2007, 2012, 2015; Werbner, 2013; Wippermann, 1983; and 
Wistrich, 1991, 2004, 2007, 2010 we would contend that Arab Antisemitism 
was influenced by European anti-Semitic literature (mainly French) published 
in Arabic in the second half of the 19th Century. Antisemitic themes and 
arguments were systematically developed by Arab propaganda as a weapon 
against the Jewish population in Palestine during the Mandate period (1917–48) 
and even more so against the newly created State of Israel (Heinemann, 2007).  
 
One of the most frequent terms in the literature on the Middle East is the term 
“Orientalism”, which of course goes back to the work of the prominent 
Palestinian intellectual of Palestinian Christian origin and professor of 
                                                          
1
 http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/libya/us-document-reveals-cooperation-between-
washington-and-brotherhood-1.1349207 
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comparative literature at Columbia University in New York, Edward Said (1935 
– 2003; Said, 1979, 1985). Said focused on what he perceived as the culturally 
inaccurate representations of the East in the Western study of the Eastern world. 
But the omnipresent hatred of America and the West could be termed as a set of 
inaccurate representations of its own - “Occidentalism” (Buruma and Margalit, 
2005; Rubin and Rubin, 2004). In addition, the intense competition between 
Islamist and secular, Marxist terror groups which still exist in the Middle East 
and the entire Muslim world (Fine, 2008), the Sunni/Shia competition as well as 
regional quests for hegemony (Rubin, 1998; Rubin and Rubin, 2004) will be 
additional factors explaining tendencies towards terrorism, especially the 
MENA region. Especially after the West’s nuclear deal with Iran, it has become 
fashionable even in Western defense and intelligence analysis circle to talk 
about the Iranian regime’s “moderation” (Bolan, 2013; Lieber and Press, 2013; 
Waltz, 2012), while our analysis is rather cautious about such assessments and 
also has to focus in the quantitative analysis on Iran’s competing, but 
nevertheless apocalyptic and extremist vision for the Middle East, especially 
targeted against the State of Israel (Beres, 2015; Eiran and Malin, 2013; 
Flannery, Deaton and Walton, 2013; Kroenig, 2012; Landau, 2013; Simon, 
2013; Terrill, 2014; Wiggington et al., 2015).  
 
To heighten the relevance of this alternative approach, we would like to present 
here first a glance at the data from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project 
Spring 2013 (Dataset for web.sav), which we compiled in our Appendix. Our 
Tables present the PEW data for the following indicators: 
 
 suicide bombing\other forms of violence against civilian targets are 
justified in order to defend Islam 
 Very favorable, or somewhat favorable, opinion of Hamas 
 very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of Hezbollah 
 very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of al Qaeda 
 very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of the Taliban 
 Islamic extremist groups are a minor threat or not a threat to the country 
 unfavorable opinion of Israel 
 Iran's nuclear program minor threat or not a threat to the country 
 
The Tables show what an uphill struggle the fight against international terrorism 
has become.  
 
 In Egypt, Malaysia and Tunisia, more than 10% of the adult population 
support suicide bombing and the following four terrorist organizations: 
Hamas; Hezbollah; al Qaeda; and the Taliban. 
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 In Indonesia and Jordan, there are 10% or more supporters of Hamas; 
Hezbollah; and Al Qaeda, and 10% or more the resident population in 
addition support either suicide bombing or the Taliban. 
 
 In Senegal and the Lebanon, 10% or more of the resident population 
support Hamas and suicide bombing, and in addition are in favor of either 
the Taliban or Hezbollah. 
 
 More than 10% of the resident population in Pakistan and Nigeria support 
Hamas and Hezbollah. Of particular concern is also the radicalization of 
segments of the Israeli Arab population, which supports to a rate of more 
than 10% Hamas and Hizbollah. In the NATO member country Turkey, 
there are more than 10% of the resident population which supports 
suicide bombing and the Taliban. 
 
 What’s more, a third or more of the resident population in key Western 
allies thinks that Islamic extremist groups are a minor threat or not a 
threat to the country: such rates were observed in Canada; Turkey; Czech 
Republic; Australia; Poland; Greece; Germany; Japan; Britain; South 
Korea; Spain; and the United States 
 
 Not only in many Muslim countries, but also in NATO member states 
such as Turkey, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, 50% 
or more of the resident population holds an unfavorable opinion of the 
State of Israel.  
 
 Iran's nuclear program is seen as constituting only a minor threat or not a 
threat at all to the country by more than 1/3 of the resident population in 
key Western allies: Canada; Turkey; Britain; Czech Republic; Spain; 
Australia; Germany; Japan; France; United States; and Poland. 
 
Just as in the 1930s, today radicalized murderers kill Jews. Today, the 
murderers are Islamists. The Paris and Copenhagen attacks in 2015 painfully 
remind us that the relationship between Islamism and Antisemitism hitherto has 
not been sufficiently dealt with in cross-national opinion research.  
 
 
4. The Shari’a state, gender repression and terrorism 
 
 
Tibi also emphasized correctly the close connection between the Islamist sharia 
ideology and the overall aspects of Islamism (Tibi, 2013a, 2013b). To highlight 
the relevance of this theoretical focus, we present some data from the 2012-
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Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims_dataset.sav and the World Values Survey 
(Muslim respondents only in each case).  
 
The PEW data concentrates on Shar’ia and its harshest aspects: 
 
 favor making the Shar’ia (Islamic law) the official law of the land 
 favor the death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion 
 favor punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like 
theft and robbery 
 favor stoning people who commit adultery 
 If a woman engages in premarital sex or adultery, it is often/sometimes 
justified for family members to end her life in order to protect the 
family’s honor 
 
The World Values Survey (71773 representative Muslims) data presented here 
focus on “the Orientalism of the Orient” in the “real existing Muslim countries” 
and the three most important WVS variables measuring xenophobia among 
global Muslim publics: 
 
% Muslims rejecting neighbors of a different race  
% Muslims rejecting neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers  
% Muslims rejecting neighbors: People of a different religion  
 
Our results offer a depressing picture of social realities in many Muslim 
countries. 50% or more of the total resident population are in favor or strong 
favor of the following measures: 
 
 Shar’ia: Afghanistan; Iraq; Palestinian Territories; Malaysia; Niger; Iran; 
Pakistan; Morocco; Bangladesh; Egypt; Indonesia; Jordan; Algeria; 
Tunisia 
 
 death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion: Egypt; 
Jordan; Afghanistan; Pakistan; Palestinian Territories; Algeria; Malaysia 
 
 punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like 
theft and robbery: Pakistan; Afghanistan; Algeria; Niger; Palestinian 
Territories; Egypt; Malaysia; Iraq; Jordan 
 
 stoning people who commit adultery: Afghanistan; Pakistan; 
Palestinian Territories; Egypt; Algeria; Niger; Jordan; Iraq; Bangladesh; 
Malaysia 
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33% or more of the total resident population are also in favor or strong favor 
of the following measure: 
 
 Honor killings (female offender): Lebanon; Egypt; Jordan; Palestinian 
Territories; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Niger 
 
More than 20% of the respective Muslim population holds racist and 
xenophobic attitudes: 
 
Rejecting neighbor of a different race: Libya; Thailand; Bangladesh; 
Palestine; India; Lebanon; Saudi Arabia; Philippines; Turkey; Egypt; Yemen; 
Jordan; Indonesia; Malaysia; Azerbaijan; Iran; Iraq; France; Kyrgyzstan; 
Cyprus; Bosnia; Nigeria; Algeria; Uganda; Mali; Ghana 
 
Rejecting neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers: Thailand; Libya; Egypt; 
Malaysia; Bangladesh; Jordan; India; Palestine; Iraq; Lebanon; Indonesia; 
Turkey; Montenegro; Iran; Cyprus; Saudi Arabia; France; Bosnia; Kazakhstan; 
Azerbaijan; Kyrgyzstan; Singapore; South Africa; Pakistan; Algeria; Nigeria; 
Mali; Bosnia; Yemen; Russia; Philippines; Serbia; Ghana 
 
Rejecting neighbor of a different religion: Libya; Yemen; Palestine; India; 
Saudi Arabia; Bangladesh; Thailand; Jordan; Algeria; Kyrgyzstan; Turkey; 
Azerbaijan; Indonesia; Lebanon; Iraq; Philippines; Malaysia; Tunisia; Iran; 
Morocco; France; Nigeria; Cyprus; Ghana; Bosnia; Mali; Albania 
 
Can the “Open Society” (Popper, 2012) of the Western world be silent about 
such phenomena? Or should the West rather support secular forces and such 
movements as the feminist movement? 
 
Without question, oppressive gender relations play a key part in the set-up of 
the “Shari’a state”. In the theoretical literature of the social sciences, gender 
relations in the Muslim world were debated at length (Ahmed, 1992; Moghissi, 
2005; Moghadam, 1994; Bouachrine, 2014). Ever since Goldin’s work (1995) 
on the U-shaped female labor force participation rate function in international 
economic development across countries and over time, economists observed for 
a long time low international rates of female labor force participation in the 
predominantly Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
(Gaddis and Klasen, 2014; Ganguli, Hausmann and Viarengo, 2014; Lechman 
and Kaur, 2015; Tsani, Paroussos, Fragiadakis, Charalambidis and Capros, 
2015; Verme, 2015; Verme, Barry and Guennouni, 2014). This observation is 
all the more relevant in our context since there is a growing agreement in recent 
literature (de Haan, 2015; Kabeer, 2012; Kabeer and Natali, 2013) that per se 
gender equality, particularly in education and employment, significantly 
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contributes to economic growth (Gaddis and Klasen, 2014). Deficiencies in the 
educational systems compound the gender imbalances in the region, as 
highlighted by a recent study by the Brookings Institution (Steer, Ghanem and 
Jalbout, 2014). These structures play also an increasing role in transnational 
migration, since there is a very high importance of differential labor force 
participation rates of different cohorts of migrants in the leading countries of 
global inward immigration over recent years (Donato, Piya and Jacobs, 2014). 
Facing such consistent socio-geographic and historical gender imbalances, 
international comparative research does not exclude anymore the “religious 
factor” and the overall “gender ideology” of a society (Besamusca, Tijdens, 
Keune and Steinmetz, 2015). Since the days of summer 2015 and the onset of 
the “European refugee crisis” (Baldacchino and Sammut, 2015; Carpenter, 
2015; Carrera and Lannoo, 2015; Cooper, 2015; Hann, 2015; Hildebrandt, 
2015; Martin, 2016; Mertes, 2015; Peters and Besley, 2015; Stewart, 2015), 
cultural differences on gender issues between the Muslim world and the West, 
which were highlighted in the theoretical literature for a long time (Moghadam, 
2002; see also: Carol and Koopmans, 2013; Ghumman and Ryan, 2013; Göle, 
2014; Helbling, 2014), were again being highlighted in the framework of 
econometric work on “oppressive gender relations” in the Muslim world 
(Tausch and Heshmati, 2016). Such an analytical focus seems to be well 
supported by the mainstream of Muslim feminist literature (Mojab, 2001; Mir-
Hosseini, 2011). Politometric work, based on the World Values Survey 
underlined Muslim support for patriarchal values as being robust against various 
controls. But rising levels of education, labor market participation, and an 
emancipative trend diminish Muslim support for patriarchy, especially among 
women (Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Adamczyk, 2013; Alemán and Woods, 
2015; Blaydes and Linzer, 2012; Norris and Inglehart, 2012; Lussier and Fish, 
2012). A leading feminist study published in 2012 (Mahmood, 2012) pleaded in 
defense of the veil and said that more attention should be given to Islamic 
virtues of female modesty or piety, especially given that many of the women 
who have taken up the veil frame their decision precisely in these terms.  
 
 
5. Methods and data 
 
 
In this essay, we used the following freely available and downloadable data files 
from global opinion surveys: 
 
 PEW Pew Research Global Attitudes Project Spring 2013 Dataset for 
web.sav. 
2
  
                                                          
2
 http://www.pewglobal.org/ 
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 PEW 2012-Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims_dataset.sav. – Muslim 
respondents only 
3
 
 
 World Values Survey. The data from the “World Values Survey”, the 
world’s largest collection of representative opinion surveys, are covering 
some 90% of the global population. The chosen SPSS data-files from the 
WVS data base is “WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014”. The global Muslim 
sample (71,773 representative Muslims) was drawn from this WVS file 
by selecting persons with the denominations given as “Druse” (18), 
“Muslim” (62,115), “Shia” (4,058), and “Sunni” (5,583). Our analysis is 
thus based on the largest survey of global Muslim opinion ever 
undertaken, and covers a large portion of the global population.  
 
In order not to overburden our essay with tables and statistical data, we have 
made our results available for the specialists, interested in following up more 
closely our research results in the Appendix to this essay. Any researcher 
around the globe with a proper access to the SPSS XXII statistical program and 
the available data should be able to reproduce our findings on a 1:1 basis. For 
this reason, our presentation of the results will be rather brief. 
 
In our empirical work, we took great care to properly take into account the fact 
that often in the PEW and WVS project, the highest numerical values of a 
variable express something else than the original PEW variable labels. Our 
appendix tables take all these points into proper consideration and guide the 
interested readers on what true variable labels the highest numerical values of 
the PEW and WVS data actually express in our multivariate analysis. Since the 
PEW data were not especially designed for a multivariate analysis, missing data 
had to be especially eliminated from the analysis. 
 
Our multivariate analysis uses the SPSS XXII standard statistical package for 
the social sciences, and we use ordinary cross tables, and the promax factor 
analysis procedures as the chosen statistical methods presented at length in a 
recent work (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015; see also: Blalock, 1972; 
Clauß and Ebner, 1970; Davidov, Schmidt and Billiet, 2011; Finch, 2006; 
Gorsuch, 1983; IBM, 2011; Rummel, 1970).  
 
In the following, we briefly deal with the choice of our variables for the 
multivariate analysis. In our following lists, the variables used as a proxy to 
measure terror support are printed in bold indented letter. 
 
                                                          
3
 http://www.pewglobal.org/ 
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Pew Research Global Attitudes Project Spring 2013  
 
Q164. Gender (female) 
Q121. suicide bombing is never justified 
Q9A. very unfavorable opinion of the United States 
Q9E. very unfavorable opinion of Russia 
Q4. economic situation in (survey country) –very bad? 
Q9D. [un]favorable opinion of Iran 
Q9G. very unfavorable opinion of the United Nations 
Q178. religion not at all important in life 
 
In a follow-up investigation, also the following variables were used 
 
Q6. Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you 
describe it – is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad? 
Q9I. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Israel? 
Q9J. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hamas? 
Q9K. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah? 
Q11E. Do you think that Iran's nuclear program is a major threat, a minor 
threat or not a threat to (survey country)? 
Q11H. Do you think that Islamic extremist groups are a major threat, a minor 
threat or not a threat to (survey country)? 
 
 
PEW 2012-Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims dataset 
 
 
Q2. Standing at the bottom of the 'ladder of life’ 
Q22a. know nothing about the Muslim religion and its practices 
Q22b. know nothing about the Christian religion and its practices 
Q36. Religion not at all important in life 
Q54. Not justified for family members to end life of a woman if she engages in 
premarital sex or adultery to protect the family’s honor 
Q65. Does not read or listen to the Koran 
Q78. completely disagree: A wife must always obey her husband 
Q89. Rejecting suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian 
targets  
Q92b. Oppose death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion 
Q92c. Oppose punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes 
like theft and robbery? 
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Q92d. Oppose stoning people who commit adultery 
Q95. Gender (female) 
 
 
World Values Survey 
 
 
Important child qualities: religious faith 
Reject opinion: jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women 
Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl 
Reject opinion: traits in a woman: Woman wearing veil 
Reject opinion: wife must obey 
Never attends religious services 
Reject opinion: only laws of the Shari´a 
Gender (female) 
Highest educational level attained 
 
 
6. What drives people into terrorism? The empirical results 
 
 
In Table 1, we highlight one of the main results of this study: the multiple 
regression results with the PEW data base on the World’s Muslims, which show 
that the two main drivers of Muslim opposition against suicide bombing is the 
rejection of honor killing and the death penalty against Muslims who chose to 
leave the Muslim community altogether.  
 
The results for the determinants of the variable 
 
Q89. Some think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against 
civilian targets are justified... Others believe that, no matter what the reason, 
this kind of violence is never justified...? 
 
are a straightforward indication based on 17614 interviewed Muslim persons 
around the globe that the Shari’a dimension has been grossly neglected in 
earlier comparative opinion research on transnational terror support rates. 
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Table 1: Explaining the rejection of suicide bombing – multiple regression results from the PEW data – the World’s 
Muslims 
 
 Regression 
coefficient B 
Standard 
error 
Beta T Error p 
Constant 1,922 0,037  51,559 0,000 
Q2. Standing at the bottom of the 'ladder of 
life’ 
0,003 0,003 0,007 0,956 0,339 
Q22a. know nothing about the Muslim 
religion and its practices  
0,070 0,009 0,057 7,755 0,000 
Q54. Not justified for family members to end 
life of a woman if she engages in premarital 
sex or adultery to protect the family’s honor  
0,231 0,006 0,287 39,365 0,000 
Q65. Does not read or listen to the Koran 0,032 0,005 0,050 6,206 0,000 
Q78. Completely disagree: A wife must 
always obey her husband 
0,014 0,007 0,015 1,953 0,051 
Q92b. Oppose death penalty for people who 
leave the Muslim religion 
0,253 0,016 0,135 15,833 0,000 
Q92c. Oppose punishments like whippings 
and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft 
and robbery? 
0,070 0,015 0,039 4,599 0,000 
Q95. Gender (female) 0,033 0,012 0,019 2,688 0,007 
 
N = 17614 representative Muslim citizens of the globe; adj. R^2 = 16.6%; F = 437,899; error p = .000 
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Appendix (1); (4); and (6) were already presented in the text above.  
 
Data Appendix (2) shows the first promax factor analysis, based on 17615 PEW 
interview partners. There are four factors which explain almost 65% of the 
variance of the variables. There is a predominantly Sunni opinion current, 
supporting terror and rejecting the West in a way, as predicted by the analysis of 
“Occidentalism” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005; Rubin and Rubin, 2004). While 
the more religious Sunni elements are relatively moderate in their apprehensions 
against the ambitions of the Shia regional power Iran, it is the more secular and 
female Sunni elements of society which hold critical opinions of Iran and its 
partner Russia. Factor three expresses opposition against terrorism in some 
countries worst affected by economic crisis. This factor contradicts the popular 
but wrong assumption that economic poverty is a 1:1 driver of terror support. 
Factor four expresses the dimension of a pronounced male secularist trend. Our 
Tables also show the correlation of components, especially the stronger positive 
trade-off between Sunni Occidentalism and the Sunni more secular negative 
opinion on Russia and Iran. The factor loading of -0.276 between “suicide 
bombing is never justified” and the predominantly Sunni Occidentalist world 
view indicates the relationship between these two processes. Our Tables also 
present the country factor scores for the four factors of the model.  
 
Appendix (3) presents an in-depth analysis of the PEW Global Survey data with 
n = 4690 respondents. The entire analysis explains more than 57% of the total 
variance. Factor 1 represents an opinion current critical of Iran and the Shia 
terrorist group Hizbollah. Factor 2 again represents Occidentalism and hatred of 
the West, while factor 3 is an opinion current, critical of the terrorist 
organization Hamas and Islamist extremism in general. Factor 4 highlights the 
close terrorist competition between radical anti-Western non-secular and secular 
forces in the Middle East, which are all too often forgotten nowadays in 
Western analyses. So factor 4 is the kind of under-class secular and radicalism 
and terror support, which can be found especially in the Lebanon but also 
partially among the population of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Factor 5 
again expresses a certain opinion current among male persons, distancing 
themselves from terrorism.  
 
We again show the correlation of the promax factors, and we also construct an 
Index of the resilience against terrorism, based on the country factor scores, 
weighted by the Eigenvalues of the factors, and the direction of influence on a 
process of the resilience against terrorism (Factor 1, 3, and 5 are untransformed, 
while factors 2 and 4 had to be multiplied by – 1 to arrive at an indicator of the 
acceptancy of the West and no under-class secular radicalism and terror 
support). Senegal and Turkey are the two Muslim societies most resilient 
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against terrorism, followed by Nigeria, Indonesia, Tunisia, Malaysia, followed 
by Jordan, Egypt and Pakistan, with the Lebanon and the Palestinian territories 
showing the least resilience against terrorism. 
 
Appendix 5 shows the results of our factor analysis for the PEW data base “The 
World’s Muslims”. More than 57% of the total variance of the variables are 
explained by four factors – rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence, 
secularism, no deeper knowledge of world religions, and under-class feminism. 
We show the correlations between the factors, and the country factor scores. 
Graph 1 summarized the most important factor loadings, and Graph 2 the 
country results for Factor 1: 
 
Graph 1: rejecting the Shari’a state 
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Graph 2: country results for rejecting the Shari’a state 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 analyses the World Values Survey data for Algeria, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The sample 
underlining our analysis is n = 9267 individuals. The total variance explained is 
more than 46%.  
 
There are three factors which emerge from our analysis: feminism, the female 
distance to the Mosque, and the rejection of Shari’a and veiled politics. In our 
appendix, we not only show the Eigenvalues and the factor loadings, but also 
the correlations of the components and the country factor scores. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and prospects 
 
 
Our article attempts to be yet another empirical contribution to the evolving 
international debate about global Islamist terrorism. We rely on standardized 
opinion surveys in different countries around the globe to elicit responses from 
the publics in the countries affected by terrorism themselves which factors 
contribute to the approval or the rejection of terrorist acts. We survey the 
existing literature and arrive at the conclusion that it would be wrong to define 
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radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with outright support for the 
immediate “bomb-throwing terror”, while neglecting the underlying ideological 
and dangerous radicalism and also ongoing radicalization of such organizations 
as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Turkish Milli Görüs, which both start, like the 
most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred of “Jews 
and Free Masons” and Western civilization as such, and which for many on 
both sides of the Atlantic appear as “moderate Islamists” and worthy partners of 
dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which the armed 
terrorist groups only can develop. We try to develop categories which are 
relevant for the empirical analysis: the omnipresent hatred of America and the 
West which we term “Occidentalism” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005); the 
intense competition between Islamist and secular, Marxist terror groups which 
still exist in the Middle East and the entire Muslim world (Fine, 2008), and the 
Sunni/Shia competition as well as regional quests for hegemony (Rubin, 1998; 
Rubin and Rubin, 2004).  
 
With Tibi we also analyze the close connection between the Islamist sharia 
ideology and the overall aspects of Islamism (Tibi, 2013a, 2013b). Based on 
PEW data, we show that the two main drivers of Muslim opposition against 
suicide bombing are the rejection of honor killing and the death penalty against 
Muslims who chose to leave the Muslim community altogether.  
 
Our promax factor analyses confirms that there is a predominantly Sunni 
opinion current which is supporting terror and rejecting the West in a way, as 
predicted by the analysis of “Occidentalism” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005; 
Rubin and Rubin, 2004). Support for Hamas and support for Islamist extremism 
in general go hand in hand. There is also an important current of under-class 
secular radicalism and terror support, which can be found especially in the 
Lebanon and among the population of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. We 
also can show that rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence go hand in 
hand. Our empirical analysis also supports the view that there is an important 
current of feminism, the female distance to the Mosque, and the rejection of 
Shari’a and veiled politics in the Muslim world.  
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Data Appendix 
 
(1) Terror support data and Iranian regime support data from Pew Research Global 
Attitudes Project Spring 2013 Dataset for web.sav – global survey 
 
 suicide bombing\other forms of 
violence against civilian targets are 
justified in order to defend Islam 
Palestinian territories 61,20 
Lebanon 32,60 
Malaysia 26,50 
Egypt 25,00 
Senegal 18,20 
Turkey 16,40 
Jordan 11,30 
Tunisia 10,60 
Israel 7,70 
Nigeria 7,60 
Indonesia 6,40 
Pakistan 4,00 
 
 Very favorable, or somewhat 
favorable, opinion of Hamas 
Palestinian territories 47,80 
Egypt 45,10 
Tunisia 44,50 
Jordan 42,70 
Lebanon 32,00 
Malaysia 24,60 
Indonesia 23,00 
Nigeria 16,00 
Israel 13,70 
Pakistan 11,60 
Senegal 10,70 
Turkey 8,10 
 
 very favorable or somewhat 
favorable opinion of Hezbollah 
Palestinian territories 43,10 
Lebanon 40,80 
Tunisia 33,60 
Indonesia 27,10 
Malaysia 26,50 
Jordan 25,10 
Egypt 19,10 
Pakistan 14,60 
Israel 14,10 
Nigeria 13,70 
Senegal 9,70 
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Turkey 7,50 
 
 very favorable or somewhat 
favorable opinion of al Qaeda 
Palestinian territories 34,00 
Indonesia 22,10 
Egypt 18,40 
Malaysia 14,50 
Tunisia 14,00 
Jordan 13,10 
Senegal 9,40 
Nigeria 8,70 
Turkey 7,40 
Lebanon 0,80 
 
 very favorable or somewhat 
favorable opinion of the Taliban 
Palestinian territories 28,80 
Egypt 25,60 
Indonesia 20,80 
Malaysia 17,80 
Senegal 15,10 
Tunisia 12,40 
Turkey 10,80 
Nigeria 9,30 
Jordan 8,60 
Lebanon 3,10 
 
 Islamic extremist groups are a minor 
threat or not a threat to the country 
China 70,70 
Jordan 61,80 
El Salvador 59,10 
Egypt 56,10 
Palestinian territories 54,00 
Venezuela 52,40 
South Africa 51,40 
Canada 51,20 
Mexico 50,00 
Turkey 49,40 
Brazil 48,30 
Malaysia 47,00 
Israel 46,60 
Czech Republic 45,60 
Australia 45,40 
Poland 44,60 
Chile 43,40 
Greece 42,70 
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Indonesia 42,50 
Germany 41,40 
Ghana 41,20 
Japan 39,70 
Russia 39,60 
Argentina 39,20 
Kenya 38,80 
Britain 36,50 
South Korea 36,20 
Philippines 35,90 
Spain 35,90 
United States 34,50 
Bolivia 32,70 
Pakistan 32,00 
Nigeria 30,10 
Lebanon 28,30 
France 27,60 
Tunisia 23,00 
Italy 22,30 
Uganda 21,60 
Senegal 21,10 
 
 unfavorable opinion of Israel 
Lebanon 98,30 
Jordan 95,40 
Palestinian territories 93,90 
Egypt 92,00 
Turkey 85,60 
Tunisia 85,10 
Greece 70,90 
Malaysia 70,90 
Indonesia 70,80 
Spain 67,10 
China 65,90 
France 65,30 
Germany 62,80 
Italy 61,70 
Pakistan 51,00 
Poland 50,50 
Czech Republic 46,80 
Senegal 44,80 
Britain 44,20 
Russia 37,70 
United States 25,20 
Nigeria 23,70 
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 Iran's nuclear program minor threat 
or not a threat to the country 
China 64,80 
Palestinian territories 59,40 
Nigeria 57,10 
Jordan 54,20 
Tunisia 52,70 
Egypt 52,50 
Venezuela 51,90 
Indonesia 50,80 
Kenya 50,70 
Pakistan 50,20 
Canada 49,50 
Turkey 49,50 
Russia 48,10 
South Africa 47,80 
Britain 47,70 
Czech Republic 47,70 
Lebanon 47,20 
Mexico 46,80 
El Salvador 46,60 
Spain 46,30 
Australia 45,90 
Germany 42,90 
Japan 42,10 
France 41,80 
Ghana 40,10 
Malaysia 39,70 
Argentina 39,10 
United States 38,70 
Poland 38,20 
Philippines 37,30 
Brazil 36,90 
South Korea 32,70 
Chile 31,00 
Bolivia 30,40 
Senegal 29,60 
Greece 29,40 
Uganda 26,00 
Italy 22,90 
Israel 20,40 
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(2) Multivariate analysis of suicide bombing and Iranian regime support, based on N = 17615 PEW respondents from the Global 
Attitudes Survey, 2013 
 
 Eigenvalue % of variance explained Cumulated of % 
variance explained 
Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support 2,026 25,323 25,323 
Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and 
Iran 
1,108 13,855 39,178 
people in economic crisis countries against terror 1,046 13,072 52,250 
male secularism 1,018 12,724 64,974 
 
 
 Predominantly 
Sunni 
Occidentalism 
and terror 
support 
Sunni more 
secular negative 
opinion on 
Russia and Iran 
people in 
economic crisis 
countries against 
terror 
male secularism 
Q164. Gender (female) -0,089 0,287 -0,081 -0,603 
Q121. suicide bombing is never justified -0,276 -0,027 0,764 -0,023 
Q9A. very unfavorable opinion of the United States 0,834 0,207 0,038 -0,015 
Q9E. very unfavorable opinion of Russia 0,356 0,792 0,045 -0,010 
Q4. economic situation in (survey country) –very bad? 0,324 0,059 0,668 0,023 
Q9D. unfavorable opinion of Iran 0,163 0,861 -0,017 0,048 
Q9G. very unfavorable opinion of the United Nations 0,822 0,271 -0,046 0,083 
Q178. religion not at all important in life -0,022 0,224 -0,062 0,809 
 Predominantly 
Sunni 
Occidentalism 
and terror 
support 
Sunni more 
secular negative 
opinion on 
Russia and Iran 
people in 
economic crisis 
countries against 
terror 
male secularism 
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correlation of components Predominantly 
Sunni 
Occidentalism 
and terror 
support 
Sunni more 
secular negative 
opinion on 
Russia and Iran 
people in 
economic crisis 
countries against 
terror 
male secularism 
Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support 1,000 0,226 0,013 0,040 
Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and 
Iran 
0,226 1,000 -0,018 0,023 
people in economic crisis countries against terror 0,013 -0,018 1,000 -0,007 
male secularism 0,040 0,023 -0,007 1,000 
 
 
 Predominantly 
Sunni 
Occidentalism 
and terror 
support 
Sunni more 
secular negative 
opinion on 
Russia and Iran 
people in 
economic crisis 
countries against 
terror 
male secularism 
Egypt 0,323 0,335 -0,083 -0,072 
Indonesia -0,840 -0,524 0,214 -0,237 
Israel -0,170 -0,082 0,008 0,607 
Jordan 0,297 0,464 0,158 -0,039 
Lebanon 0,152 -0,069 0,157 0,271 
Malaysia -0,532 -0,523 -0,764 -0,165 
Nigeria -0,671 -0,171 0,243 -0,062 
Pakistan 0,578 -0,719 0,779 -0,061 
Palestinian territories 0,794 0,182 -0,710 -0,077 
Senegal -1,348 -0,616 -0,330 -0,288 
Tunisia -0,045 0,036 0,544 0,188 
Turkey 0,384 0,643 -0,244 0,169 
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 Predominantly 
Sunni 
Occidentalism 
and terror 
support 
Sunni more 
secular negative 
opinion on 
Russia and Iran 
people in 
economic crisis 
countries against 
terror 
male secularism 
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(3) Multivariate analysis of terror support and Iranian regime support from N = 4690 (in depth analysis from PEW Global Survey 
data), R^2 = 57,210 % 
 
 Eigenvalue % of variance 
explained 
Cumulated of % 
variance explained 
Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah 2,492 19,166 19,166 
Occidentalism 1,821 14,011 33,177 
Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism 1,087 8,364 41,542 
under-class secular radicalism and terror support 1,030 7,922 49,464 
male secular distance from terrorism 1,007 7,746 57,210 
 
 
 Critical of 
Iran, critical of 
Hizbollah 
Occidentalis
m 
Against 
Hamas, 
against 
Islamist 
extremism 
under-class 
secular 
radicalism 
and terror 
support 
male secular 
distance from 
terrorism 
Q6. Now thinking about your personal economic 
situation, how would you describe it – is it very 
good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad? 
0,149 0,186 -0,167 0,436 -0,037 
Q9A. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very 
unfavorable opinion of the United States? 
0,020 0,835 -0,151 0,138 -0,041 
Q9D. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very 
unfavorable opinion of Iran? 
0,808 0,218 -0,041 0,168 -0,079 
Q9E. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very 
unfavorable opinion of Russia? 
0,651 0,396 -0,063 0,081 0,039 
Q9G. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very 
0,108 0,785 -0,060 0,208 0,036 
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unfavorable opinion of the United Nations? 
Q9I. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very 
unfavorable opinion of Israel? 
0,166 0,538 -0,079 -0,010 -0,076 
Q9J. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very 
unfavorable opinion of Hamas? 
0,484 -0,033 0,603 0,025 0,371 
Q9K. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, 
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very 
unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah? 
0,810 -0,039 0,263 -0,022 0,198 
Q11E. Do you think that Iran's nuclear program is a 
major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to 
(survey country)? 
-0,567 0,151 -0,110 0,013 0,305 
Q11H. Do you think that Islamic extremist groups 
are a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to 
(survey country)? 
0,007 0,095 -0,762 0,019 0,095 
Q121. suicide bombing\other forms of violence 
against civilian targets never justified 
0,087 -0,137 0,339 -0,477 0,326 
Q164. Gender 0,052 0,038 0,003 0,005 -0,785 
Q178. How important is religion in your life – very 
important, somewhat important, not too important, 
or not at all important? 
0,053 -0,006 0,315 0,791 0,205 
 Critical of 
Iran, critical of 
Hizbollah 
Occidentalis
m 
Against 
Hamas, 
against 
Islamist 
extremism 
under-class 
secular 
radicalism 
and terror 
support 
male secular 
distance from 
terrorism 
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Correlation of components Critical of 
Iran, critical of 
Hizbollah 
Occidentalis
m 
Against 
Hamas, 
against 
Islamist 
extremism 
under-class 
secular 
radicalism 
and terror 
support 
male secular 
distance from 
terrorism 
Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah 1,000 0,113 0,159 0,050 0,072 
Occidentalism 0,113 1,000 -0,196 0,161 -0,024 
Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism 0,159 -0,196 1,000 0,010 0,269 
under-class secular radicalism and terror support 0,050 0,161 0,010 1,000 0,008 
male secular distance from terrorism 0,072 -0,024 0,269 0,008 1,000 
 
 
Country  Critical of 
Iran, critical of 
Hizbollah 
Occidentalis
m 
Against 
Hamas, 
against 
Islamist 
extremism 
under-class 
secular 
radicalism 
and terror 
support 
male secular 
distance from 
terrorism 
Egypt Mean 0,328 0,298 -0,330 0,214 -0,217 
 N 622 622 622 622 622 
Indonesia Mean -0,341 -0,872 0,282 -0,547 0,104 
 N 497 497 497 497 497 
Jordan Mean 0,322 0,433 -0,226 0,028 -0,053 
 N 697 697 697 697 697 
Lebanon Mean -0,270 0,067 0,082 0,574 -0,205 
 N 521 521 521 521 521 
Malaysia Mean -0,423 -0,411 0,011 -0,441 -0,169 
 N 269 269 269 269 269 
Nigeria Mean -0,126 -0,579 0,162 -0,314 0,493 
 N 132 132 132 132 132 
Pakistan Mean -0,782 0,203 -0,009 -0,469 0,676 
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 N 204 204 204 204 204 
Palestinian territories Mean -0,090 0,544 -0,530 0,469 -0,411 
 N 504 504 504 504 504 
Senegal Mean -0,186 -1,581 0,437 -0,332 -0,002 
 N 286 286 286 286 286 
Tunisia Mean -0,198 0,008 0,222 -0,218 0,112 
 N 450 450 450 450 450 
Turkey Mean 0,707 0,455 0,391 0,064 0,447 
 N 508 508 508 508 508 
Country  Critical of 
Iran, critical of 
Hizbollah 
Occidentalis
m 
Against 
Hamas, 
against 
Islamist 
extremism 
under-class 
secular 
radicalism 
and terror 
support 
male secular 
distance from 
terrorism 
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original factor Eigenvalue re-interpretation for the Index 
construction 
weight 
applied on 
the original 
factor scores 
Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah 2,492 Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah 2,492 
Occidentalism 1,821 Liking the West -1,821 
Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism 1,087 Against Hamas, against Islamist 
extremism 
1,087 
under-class secular radicalism and terror support 1,030 no under-class secular radicalism and 
terror support 
-1,030 
male secular distance from terrorism 1,007 male secular distance from terrorism 1,007 
 
 
 Critical of 
Iran, 
critical of 
Hizbollah 
Liking he 
West 
Against Hamas, 
against Islamist 
extremism 
No under-class 
secular 
radicalism and 
terror support 
male secular 
distance from 
terrorism 
Resilience of 
civil society 
against Islamist 
terrorism 
Senegal -0,463 2,879 0,475 0,342 -0,002 3,232 
Turkey 1,762 -0,828 0,425 -0,066 0,450 1,742 
Nigeria -0,314 1,055 0,177 0,324 0,497 1,739 
Indonesia -0,851 1,588 0,306 0,563 0,104 1,710 
Tunisia -0,494 -0,015 0,242 0,224 0,113 0,070 
Malaysia -1,053 0,748 0,012 0,455 -0,170 -0,009 
Jordan 0,802 -0,788 -0,245 -0,029 -0,054 -0,313 
Egypt 0,817 -0,543 -0,358 -0,220 -0,218 -0,523 
Pakistan -1,948 -0,370 -0,010 0,483 0,680 -1,165 
Lebanon -0,672 -0,122 0,089 -0,591 -0,207 -1,502 
Palestinian territories -0,223 -0,992 -0,576 -0,483 -0,414 -2,688 
 Critical of 
Iran, 
Liking he 
West 
Against Hamas, 
against Islamist 
No under-class 
secular 
male secular 
distance from 
Resilience of 
civil society 
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critical of 
Hizbollah 
extremism radicalism and 
terror support 
terrorism against Islamist 
terrorism 
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(4) Support for the Shari’a state based on 2012-Pew-Religion-Worlds-
Muslims_dataset.sav – Muslim respondents only 
 
 favor making the Shar’ia (Islamic 
law) the official law of the land 
Afghanistan 98,70 
Iraq 90,50 
Palestinian Territories 89,80 
Malaysia 86,30 
Niger 84,20 
Iran 82,90 
Pakistan 82,40 
Morocco 82,30 
Bangladesh 81,20 
Egypt 74,70 
Indonesia 72,10 
Jordan 70,00 
Algeria 69,10 
Tunisia 53,80 
Kyrgyzstan 34,60 
Lebanon 29,40 
Tajikistan 26,50 
Kosovo 21,20 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 14,00 
Albania 13,10 
Turkey 12,70 
Kazakhstan 10,80 
Azerbaijan 6,90 
 
 
 favor the death penalty for people 
who leave the Muslim religion 
Egypt 88,30 
Jordan 82,40 
Afghanistan 80,30 
Pakistan 73,70 
Palestinian Territories 61,50 
Algeria 59,60 
Malaysia 57,90 
Bangladesh 44,00 
Iraq 41,10 
Niger 30,50 
Thailand 23,10 
Lebanon 18,10 
Tunisia 16,60 
Indonesia 16,30 
Russia 9,20 
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Kyrgyzstan 9,10 
Turkey 8,60 
Tajikistan 8,50 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,40 
Kosovo 3,20 
Albania 2,20 
Azerbaijan 1,30 
Kazakhstan 0,80 
 
 
 favor punishments like whippings 
and cutting off of hands for crimes 
like theft and robbery 
Pakistan 82,10 
Afghanistan 81,80 
Algeria 79,30 
Niger 78,50 
Palestinian Territories 72,70 
Egypt 69,60 
Malaysia 58,90 
Iraq 54,90 
Jordan 53,20 
Bangladesh 49,80 
Thailand 42,10 
Indonesia 38,70 
Kyrgyzstan 35,70 
Tunisia 26,40 
Russia 23,00 
Lebanon 22,90 
Tajikistan 20,20 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 15,80 
Turkey 13,50 
Kazakhstan 13,10 
Albania 9,80 
Kosovo 9,70 
Azerbaijan 5,60 
 
 
 favor stoning people who commit 
adultery 
Afghanistan 84,90 
Pakistan 83,50 
Palestinian Territories 81,60 
Egypt 78,60 
Algeria 72,90 
Niger 68,20 
Jordan 64,80 
Iraq 57,20 
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Bangladesh 52,90 
Malaysia 52,30 
Thailand 45,40 
Indonesia 42,70 
Tunisia 26,90 
Kyrgyzstan 26,00 
Lebanon 23,20 
Tajikistan 22,90 
Azerbaijan 15,00 
Russia 14,10 
Turkey 9,80 
Kosovo 9,30 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8,00 
Albania 6,10 
Kazakhstan 5,80 
 
 
 If a woman engages in premarital sex 
or adultery, it is often/sometimes 
justified for family members to end 
her life in order to protect the 
family’s honor 
Lebanon 45,10 
Egypt 39,00 
Jordan 38,80 
Palestinian Territories 38,70 
Pakistan 37,10 
Bangladesh 34,50 
Niger 34,50 
Algeria 29,40 
Thailand 27,00 
Tunisia 26,80 
Tajikistan 24,20 
Malaysia 20,80 
Russia 18,80 
Turkey 18,80 
Kosovo 18,60 
Kyrgyzstan 18,10 
Albania 12,80 
Morocco 10,30 
Indonesia 8,20 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 7,20 
Azerbaijan 6,80 
Kazakhstan 4,40 
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(5) Multivariate analysis of the PEW “The World’s Muslims” data on support for the Shari’a state and suicide bombing 
 
 Eigenvalue % of variance 
explained 
Cumulated of % variance 
explained 
rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence 3,360 28,001 28,001 
secularism 1,291 10,758 38,759 
no knowledge of world religions 1,146 9,551 48,310 
feminism 1,085 9,044 57,354 
 
 
 rejecting the 
Shari’a state 
and Islamist 
violence 
secularism no knowledge of 
world religions 
under-class 
feminism 
Q2. Standing at the bottom of the 'ladder of life’ 0,010 0,043 -0,214 0,476 
Q22a. know nothing about the Muslim religion and its 
practices 
0,172 0,550 0,556 0,012 
Q22b. know nothing about the Christian religion and 
its practices 
-0,052 -0,075 0,799 -0,008 
Q36. Religion not at all important in life 0,289 0,774 0,031 -0,036 
Q54. Not justified for family members to end life of a 
woman if she engages in premarital sex or adultery to 
protect the family’s honor 
0,607 0,039 0,181 0,419 
Q65. Does not read or listen to the Koran 0,428 0,747 0,029 -0,031 
Q78. completely disagree: A wife must always obey 
her husband 
0,288 0,639 -0,133 0,248 
Q89. Rejecting suicide bombing and other forms of 
violence against civilian targets  
0,554 0,033 0,333 0,424 
Q92b. Oppose death penalty for people who leave the 
Muslim religion 
0,767 0,394 -0,019 -0,063 
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Q92c. Oppose punishments like whippings and cutting 
off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery? 
0,784 0,425 -0,115 -0,133 
Q92d. Oppose stoning people who commit adultery 0,813 0,451 -0,134 -0,095 
Q95. Gender (female) 0,034 0,041 0,102 0,660 
 rejecting the 
Shari’a state 
and Islamist 
violence 
secularism no knowledge of 
world religions 
under-class 
feminism 
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Correlation of components rejecting the 
Shari’a state 
and Islamist 
violence and 
gender ideology 
secularism no knowledge of 
world religions 
under-class 
feminism 
rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence and 
gender ideology 
1,000 0,370 0,042 0,111 
secularism 0,370 1,000 -0,022 -0,083 
no knowledge of world religions 0,042 -0,022 1,000 0,165 
under-class feminism 0,111 -0,083 0,165 1,000 
 
 
Country rejecting the 
Shari’a state 
and Islamist 
violence and 
gender ideology 
secularism no knowledge of 
world religions 
under-class 
feminism 
Albania 0,710 1,638 0,055 0,057 
Algeria -0,720 -0,646 0,043 0,249 
Azerbaijan 0,835 0,799 0,243 0,100 
Bangladesh -0,413 -0,234 0,017 -0,285 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,782 0,631 -1,022 0,370 
Egypt -1,048 -0,429 -0,099 -0,254 
Indonesia 0,278 -0,655 0,271 0,297 
Jordan -0,748 -0,538 -0,257 0,099 
Kazakhstan 0,852 1,025 0,203 0,233 
Kosovo 0,638 1,000 0,211 -0,355 
Kyrgyzstan 0,357 0,355 0,239 0,037 
Malaysia -0,499 -0,775 -0,187 0,482 
Niger -0,730 -0,618 -0,121 -0,620 
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Pakistan -0,923 -0,583 0,524 0,285 
Palestinian Territories -1,001 -0,421 -0,323 -0,113 
Russia 0,565 0,630 -0,104 0,076 
Tajikistan 0,545 0,253 0,025 -0,250 
Tunisia 0,295 -0,345 0,291 -0,290 
Turkey 0,586 0,353 -0,295 0,009 
Country rejecting the 
Shari’a state 
and Islamist 
violence and 
gender ideology 
secularism no knowledge of 
world religions 
under-class 
feminism 
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(6) World Values Survey data on Occidentalism in the Muslim world 
World Values Survey 71773 representative Muslims from 
Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; 
Bosnia; Bosnia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Canada; China; Colombia; Croatia; Cyprus; 
Egypt; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Great Britain; 
Guatemala; Hong Kong; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kazakhstan; 
Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lebanon; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia; Malaysia; Mali; Mexico; 
Moldova; Montenegro; Morocco; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; 
Palestine; Peru; Philippines; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Serbia and 
Montenegro; Singapore; Slovenia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; 
Taiwan; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; 
United States; Uzbekistan; Viet Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe 
 
 % Muslims 
rejecting neighbors 
of a different race 
N = 
Libya 55,80 2050 
Thailand 47,70 65 
Bangladesh 45,30 2684 
Palestine 43,90 997 
India 43,80 983 
Lebanon 39,90 622 
Saudi Arabia 38,00 1457 
Philippines 36,60 123 
Turkey 34,40 7825 
Egypt 34,10 2830 
Yemen 34,00 1000 
Jordan 33,20 3499 
Indonesia 32,80 2778 
Malaysia 30,40 1509 
Azerbaijan 29,00 2794 
Iran 28,00 5080 
Iraq 27,80 1188 
France 27,70 47 
Kyrgyzstan 26,50 2111 
Cyprus 24,90 497 
Bosnia 24,90 317 
Nigeria 24,10 2189 
Algeria 23,90 2476 
Uganda 23,70 169 
Mali 22,10 1426 
Ghana 21,30 404 
Rwanda 19,70 305 
Tanzania 18,60 469 
Macedonia 18,20 506 
Germany 17,80 146 
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Morocco 16,90 3633 
Tunisia 16,90 1205 
Georgia 15,70 166 
Serbia and Montenegro 15,20 33 
Montenegro 14,70 68 
Uzbekistan 14,40 1426 
Ethiopia 13,90 158 
Kazakhstan 13,80 756 
Bulgaria 12,20 238 
South Africa 11,70 273 
Russia 11,20 366 
Pakistan 11,10 2459 
China 11,10 117 
Serbia 10,40 125 
Bosnia 9,50 485 
Great Britain 9,30 43 
Burkina Faso 9,20 818 
Singapore 9,20 557 
Albania 8,80 706 
Slovenia 7,30 41 
Sweden 5,40 37 
Finland 4,80 63 
Trinidad and Tobago 3,20 124 
Netherlands 1,90 53 
Canada 1,70 58 
Australia 0,00 33 
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 % Muslims 
rejecting 
neighbors: 
Immigrants/foreig
n workers 
n = 
Thailand 61,50 65 
Libya 58,70 2050 
Egypt 58,60 2830 
Malaysia 57,70 1509 
Bangladesh 48,30 2684 
Jordan 47,90 3499 
India 42,30 983 
Palestine 39,80 997 
Iraq 38,90 1188 
Lebanon 38,60 622 
Indonesia 37,00 2775 
Turkey 36,60 7826 
Montenegro 36,20 69 
Iran 35,20 5079 
Cyprus 35,00 497 
Saudi Arabia 33,30 1457 
France 31,90 47 
Bosnia 29,00 317 
Kazakhstan 28,50 755 
Azerbaijan 28,10 2794 
Kyrgyzstan 28,00 2111 
Singapore 27,30 557 
South Africa 26,00 273 
Pakistan 25,60 2459 
Algeria 25,50 2476 
Nigeria 24,50 2189 
Mali 24,50 1426 
Bosnia 24,50 485 
Yemen 24,20 1000 
Russia 24,10 365 
Philippines 22,60 124 
Serbia 21,60 125 
Ghana 20,80 404 
Tanzania 19,20 469 
Tunisia 18,80 1205 
Rwanda 18,70 305 
Morocco 18,10 3630 
Ethiopia 17,70 158 
Macedonia 16,00 506 
Serbia and Montenegro 15,20 33 
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Germany 14,40 146 
Uganda 14,20 169 
Georgia 13,90 166 
Uzbekistan 12,40 1426 
Burkina Faso 11,20 818 
Albania 10,30 706 
Bulgaria 8,40 238 
Slovenia 7,30 41 
Trinidad and Tobago 6,40 125 
China 3,40 117 
Australia 3,00 33 
Great Britain 2,30 43 
Finland 0,00 63 
Canada 0,00 58 
Netherlands 0,00 53 
Sweden 0,00 36 
 
 
 rejecting 
neighbors: People 
of a different 
religion 
n = 
Libya 54,80 2050 
Yemen 53,30 1000 
Palestine 50,30 997 
India 46,30 600 
Saudi Arabia 40,80 1457 
Bangladesh 40,10 2684 
Thailand 40,00 65 
Jordan 37,90 3499 
Algeria 37,10 2476 
Kyrgyzstan 36,30 1336 
Turkey 35,70 6231 
Azerbaijan 35,70 973 
Indonesia 35,50 2782 
Lebanon 35,40 622 
Iraq 34,00 5792 
Philippines 30,60 72 
Malaysia 29,90 1509 
Tunisia 29,70 1205 
Iran 29,50 5080 
Morocco 27,70 2354 
France 27,70 47 
Nigeria 27,60 1397 
Cyprus 27,10 498 
Ghana 25,00 404 
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Bosnia 24,60 317 
Mali 24,10 1426 
Albania 22,10 706 
Rwanda 17,70 305 
Pakistan 16,30 2459 
Germany 16,20 148 
Uzbekistan 15,70 1426 
Serbia and Montenegro 15,20 33 
Kazakhstan 14,00 756 
Russia 12,60 261 
Burkina Faso 11,70 818 
Ethiopia 11,40 158 
Singapore 10,30 321 
South Africa 8,60 81 
Bulgaria 7,10 238 
Georgia 5,40 166 
China 5,00 100 
Slovenia 4,90 41 
Trinidad and Tobago 1,60 125 
Netherlands 0,00 53 
Great Britain 0,00 43 
Canada 0,00 36 
Sweden 0,00 32 
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(7) Multivariate analysis on Occidentalism and support for the Shari’a state with data from the World Values Survey, WVS, n = 9267 
with complete data 
 
 Eigenvalue % of variance 
explained 
Cumulated % of 
variance explained 
feminism 1,753 19,480 19,480 
female distance to the Mosque 1,357 15,080 34,560 
rejecting Shari’a and veiled politics 1,046 11,619 46,178 
 
 
 feminism female distance to the 
Mosque 
rejecting Shari’a and 
veiled politics 
Important child qualities: religious faith 0,065 0,028 -0,539 
Reject opinion: jobs scarce: Men should have more 
right to a job than women 
0,551 0,046 0,152 
Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy 
than for a girl 
0,599 0,253 0,041 
Reject opinion: traits in a woman: Woman wearing veil 0,331 -0,040 0,721 
Reject opinion: wife must obey 0,578 0,272 0,204 
Never attends religious services 0,029 0,741 0,014 
Reject opinion: only laws of the Shari´a 0,146 0,048 0,699 
Gender (female) 0,279 0,772 -0,015 
Highest educational level attained 0,560 -0,347 -0,009 
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Correlation of components feminism female distance to the 
Mosque 
rejecting Shari’a and 
veiled politics 
feminism 1,000 0,102 0,184 
female distance to the Mosque 0,102 1,000 0,021 
rejecting Shari’a and veiled politics 0,184 0,021 1,000 
 
 
Country/region feminism female 
distance to the 
Mosque 
rejecting 
Shari’a and 
veiled politics 
Algeria 0,398 -0,021 0,182 
Bangladesh -0,079 -0,231 0,718 
Indonesia 0,612 -0,297 0,288 
Iraq -0,375 0,233 -0,095 
Jordan 0,041 0,252 -0,156 
Nigeria -0,331 -0,617 0,620 
Saudi Arabia 0,017 -0,130 -0,327 
Egypt -0,061 0,128 -0,277 
 
